Procedural nullities in European and international criminal law: a crucial issue for the defense

Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 3 February 2026, No. 23-84.650

Introduction

Labour criminal law is כיום one of the primary instruments for protecting the physical integrity of workers. At the crossroads of general criminal law and labour law, it sanctions harm to employees’ health and safety when such harm results from breaches of obligations imposed on the employer. The offence of unintentional injury occupies a central place in this regard. Under Article 222-20 of the Criminal Code, the mental element of the offence may be established when the damage results from the manifestly deliberate breach of a specific obligation of prudence or safety imposed by law or regulation.

The main difficulty lies in identifying this specific obligation. For many years, case law has distinguished between general prevention principles, which structure occupational health policy, and precise, directly applicable obligations, the breach of which may trigger the employer’s criminal liability.

It is precisely this distinction that is clarified by the judgment delivered by the Criminal Chamber on 3 February 2026. The facts of the case tragically illustrate the stakes involved in criminal litigation concerning workplace safety. An employee was seriously burned following the explosion of an industrial cauldron. The accident originated from overpressure caused by the freezing of a safety valve. By fully opening the valve, the employee triggered the explosion of the equipment.

At first instance, the employer was convicted of unintentional injury resulting from the manifestly deliberate breach of a specific safety obligation. However, the Court of Appeal acquitted the employer. The trial judges considered that the obligation relied upon was not sufficiently precise to characterize the criminal fault required by Article 222-20 of the Criminal Code. According to them, no provision specifically required the employer to check that the valve had not frozen.

The legal question before the Court of Cassation was therefore decisive:
Does a regulatory provision requiring the employer to organize the evacuation of energy in a safe manner constitute a specific safety obligation, even though it does not specify the technical measures to be implemented?

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, relying on Article R. 4323-9 of the Labour Code, which requires the employer to organize the use of equipment in such a way as to ensure the safe release of energy.

Through this ruling, the Criminal Chamber provides an important clarification in the structure of labour criminal law: it clearly distinguishes general prevention principles, notably from Articles L. 4121-1 and L. 4121-2 of the Labour Code, from specific safety obligations capable of grounding criminal liability.

This decision forms part of a line of case law aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of workplace safety rules, structured around three central notions:

• the obligation of safety,
• the employer’s criminal liability,
• the protection of the employee’s physical integrity.

Thus, the decision of 3 February 2026 raises the question of the normative scope of regulatory safety obligations and their role in establishing criminal fault.

The issue is therefore as follows:
To what extent can a broadly worded regulatory obligation constitute a specific safety obligation capable of characterizing the offence of unintentional injury?

To answer this, the Criminal Chamber both clarifies the distinction between general principles and specific safety obligations (I) and reinforces the duty of vigilance incumbent upon the employer in assessing criminal fault (II).

I – Clarification of the notion of a specific safety obligation in labour criminal law

A – Exclusion of general prevention principles from the scope of qualified criminal fault

The first contribution of the judgment lies in the clear distinction it draws between general prevention principles and specific safety obligations.

Articles L. 4121-1 and L. 4121-2 of the Labour Code require the employer to take the necessary measures to ensure safety and protect the physical and mental health of workers. These provisions form the foundation of occupational health law. They structure prevention policy through several principles, including risk assessment, prevention planning, and adapting work to the individual.

However, the Criminal Chamber recalls that these provisions do not, in themselves, create obligations sufficiently precise to constitute the qualified fault required by Article 222-20 of the Criminal Code.

It specifies that these texts do not establish “any specific safety obligation that is objective, immediately perceptible, and clearly applicable without room for personal assessment.”

This wording is essential. It reveals that a specific safety obligation must meet three criteria:

• objectivity,
• immediate applicability,
• absence of discretion for the employer.

In other words, the rule must impose a precise course of conduct whose breach is easily identifiable.

This distinction is not new, but it is expressed here with great clarity. It is part of consistent case law aimed at avoiding excessive criminalization of the general obligation of safety.

Indeed, if general prevention principles were sufficient to establish criminal fault, any failure in the organization of prevention could potentially trigger the employer’s criminal liability. Such an extension would be incompatible with the principle of legality of offences and penalties.

Thus, the Criminal Chamber preserves the balance between the requirement to ensure worker safety and the legal certainty of employers.

B – Recognition of a regulatory obligation as a specific safety obligation

The second step in the reasoning consists in recognizing that Article R. 4323-9 of the Labour Code does indeed constitute a specific safety obligation.

This provision requires the employer to organize the use of work equipment so as to allow the safe release of energy.

The Court of Appeal had considered that this provision remained too general to constitute a specific obligation, since it did not specify the technical measures to be implemented.

The Court of Cassation adopts the opposite position.

It considers that this obligation is:

• objective,
• immediately perceptible,
• clearly applicable.

The absence of detailed technical guidance does not prevent its classification as a specific obligation.

This solution is fundamental, as it recognizes that the precision of an obligation does not necessarily depend on the level of technical detail in the text.

What matters is that the rule imposes an identifiable result: ensuring the safe release of energy from equipment.

This approach strengthens the effectiveness of labour criminal law. It prevents an employer from escaping liability by invoking the absence of exhaustive technical requirements.

The Criminal Chamber thus affirms that workplace safety also relies on an obligation to anticipate risks.

II – Strengthening the employer’s criminal liability in assessing deliberate fault

A – The importance of the factual context in characterizing fault

After qualifying the safety obligation, the Court of Cassation criticizes the Court of Appeal for failing to examine the concrete circumstances of the accident.

The decision emphasizes that several elements should have been taken into account:

• weather conditions,
• adverse weather events,
• prior malfunctions of the installation.

These elements could have revealed the employer’s awareness of the risk.

However, manifestly deliberate fault requires precisely that the perpetrator be aware of the danger and nevertheless decide not to act.

The Criminal Chamber therefore recalls that the analysis of criminal fault must be contextual.

It cannot be limited to an abstract reading of the regulatory provision.

B – Case law reinforcing the effectiveness of labour criminal safety law

The scope of this judgment goes far beyond the specific case.

It forms part of a broader evolution of labour criminal law aimed at strengthening the prevention of industrial accidents.

By recognizing that a general regulatory obligation can constitute a specific safety obligation, the Court of Cassation broadens the situations in which the employer’s criminal liability may be engaged.

This evolution responds to a strong social requirement: ensuring the effective protection of workers’ physical integrity.

Labour criminal law thus appears as a tool for regulating occupational risks.

It encourages employers to develop a genuine safety culture within the company.

Conclusion

The judgment delivered by the Criminal Chamber on 3 February 2026 constitutes a particularly important decision in the development of labour criminal law.

By clarifying the notion of a specific safety obligation, the Court of Cassation specifies the conditions under which an employer’s criminal liability may be incurred for unintentional injury.

The first contribution of the decision is to reaffirm the fundamental distinction between general prevention principles and specific safety obligations. Articles L. 4121-1 and L. 4121-2 of the Labour Code form the foundation of occupational health law, but their general wording alone does not make it possible to establish the qualified criminal fault required by Article 222-20 of the Criminal Code.

This clarification is essential to preserve the principle of legality of offences and penalties. It prevents the general safety obligation, by nature broad and evolving, from becoming an automatic basis for criminal liability.

However, the major contribution of the decision lies in recognizing the normative scope of certain regulatory obligations. By ruling that Article R. 4323-9 of the Labour Code constitutes a specific safety obligation, the Court of Cassation affirms that the precision of an obligation does not necessarily depend on the level of technical detail in the text.

What matters is that the rule imposes identifiable and immediately applicable conduct.

This pragmatic approach ensures the effectiveness of workplace safety rules. It prevents employers from relying on the absence of exhaustive technical requirements to evade liability.

The decision also highlights the importance of analyzing the concrete circumstances in establishing manifestly deliberate fault. Trial judges must examine all factors capable of demonstrating the employer’s awareness of the risk.

This requirement strengthens the preventive dimension of labour criminal law. It encourages companies to adopt proactive risk management, particularly when a danger has already been identified.

Beyond the technical issue of classifying safety obligations, the judgment forms part of a broader evolution toward increased accountability of economic actors.

In a context marked by the growing complexity of industrial and technological environments, workplace safety cannot rely solely on detailed technical rules. It also requires the ability to anticipate and adapt to real-life situations.

Thus, case law contributes to structuring a genuine semantic framework of labour criminal safety law, organized around three fundamental notions:

• the obligation of safety,
• the prevention of occupational risks,
• the employer’s criminal liability.

The judgment of 3 February 2026 perfectly illustrates this dynamic. By recognizing the criminal significance of a regulatory safety obligation, the Court of Cassation reaffirms that protecting workers’ health and physical integrity is a fundamental requirement of the legal order.

For practitioners of labour law and labour criminal law, this decision calls for increased vigilance in analyzing the regulatory obligations applicable to companies. It confirms that an employer’s criminal liability may be incurred as soon as an identifiable risk has not been anticipated or addressed with the required diligence.

Ultimately, this case law marks a further step in the construction of a labour criminal law that is demanding, preventive, and protective.